The Challenger Disaster - Responsibility of Morton Thiokol Inc. Essay

The Ch all(prenominal)enger disaster was not only a disaster in terms of the destruction of the spacecraft and the death of its crew precisely also in terms of the termination-making mathematical bring that led to the erect and in terms of the subsequent investigation into the "causes" of the disaster. The decision to recommend for launch was made by lower-level management officials over the objections of adept experts who opposed the launch under the environmental conditions that existed on the launch plump out at the time. Furthermore, the lower-level managers who made this decision--both NASA and contractor personnel--chose not to report the objections of the practiced experts in their recommendations to higher levels in the management chain- of-command to proceed with the launch. Finally, it seems that the lower-level managers had also received out-of-the-ordinary thrust from higher levels of management (some allusions suggested this pressure may have come all the way from the White House) to proceed with the launch on time. The subsequent investigation began with lathers to determine the technical causes of the explosion of the Challenger. Initially, the decision-making process leading to the launch was not considered by investigators. This suggests that the initial purpose of the investigation was not concerned with honest issues or issues of responsibility. As the investigation proceeded, information emerged through leaks to the press, which suggested that NASA had been aware of the risk of explosion under the environmental conditions that existed for the Challenger launch for several months precedent to the launch. Also, the opposition of the technical experts to the launch just prior to the decision to launch became known to the investigators as well. These two pieces of information changed the nature of the investigation mid-stream from an effort to determine the technical cause of the explosion of the spacecraft to an investiga tion of thedecision-making process leading to the launch. Viewing the Challenger disaster as an ethical fuss would lead to an effort to determine whether the decision to launch was "right" or "wrong." Clearly, the explosion was an accident. It was an accident that might have been prevented or anticipated but the decision to launch was clearly a matter of judgment--albeit of apparently woeful judgment in retrospect--rather than... ...s associated with launching in the environmental conditions at the time. Lower-level managers were fit to avoid accountability for both the final decision to launch (made by higher levels of management) and for recognition of the technical risks associated with launching (resting in the failure of technical experts to provide justification against launching in technical specifications or schematic regulations). Each of these factors--the management chain-of-command, the role of technical specifications and formal regulations, and the availability of information--served to both hinder the ability of decision-makers to act and to obscure accountability for their decision-making. As such, they served to gear up the responsibility of individuals in spite of appearance the decision-making process and to render that process itself irresponsible. These obstacles to responsibility deep down NASA point to the more important ethical problem that existed beyond the setting of the specific instance of the Challenger disaster. Namely, the poor nature of the decision-making process within NASA and its negative role in fostering responsibility, both on the single out of individuals and on the part of the organization as a who